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Abstract
We explore patterns of successive migration within rural households in Ghana and
the impact that these successive migrants have on household welfare outcomes.
Specifically, we use a household panel survey collected in 2013 and 2015. We exploit
the panel nature of the data and a weighting method to overcome sources of bias.
Welfare is measured with an index of housing quality. We find that successive migrants
face lower migration costs, and few of them remit. We find no effect of sending a new
migrant on the housing quality index. We conclude that the different nature
of migration of successive migrants implies neither an economic gain for the
household nor a loss. The reason is that the successive migration becomes less
costly for migrants from households with prior migration experience, but at the
same time, these migrants remit less or not at all compared to earlier waves of
migrants.
JEL Classification: R23, C38, D10
Keywords: Migration, Ghana, Housing quality index, Multiple correspondence
analysis, Entropy balancing weights
1 Introduction
Internal migration is a common and sizeable phenomenon in many developing coun-
tries. An estimated 740 million people live outside their region of birth (Bell and
Muhidin 2009). Differences in regional economic performance induce people to leave
poorer areas and move to those where more and better opportunities are located. In
Ghana, around 35% of people in the population Census of 2010 had moved from their
place of birth to another location within the country (Ghana Statistical Service 2013a).
Many people move from poorer to richer regions, some move with the whole house-
hold and others send a member of the household (Litchfield and Waddington 2003;
Molini et al. 2016).
Internal migration plays an important role in poverty reduction and economic devel-
opment at the individual, household and macroeconomic level. On the one hand, it
contributes to structural change in the country when rural workers move into
non-agricultural work in urban areas (Harris and Todaro 1970). On the other hand,
migration of a household member can insure the sending household against income
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shocks in the origin. Such insurance can prevent households from falling into poverty.
Moreover, the income earned by the migrant member can raise consumption levels at
home or even pay for investments in profitable technologies (Stark and Bloom 1985).
Additionally, geographic mobility offers young people the possibility to advance in their
education and gain new skills if their origins do not provide these opportunities.
Because of its size and relevance for economic development, economists study in-
ternal migration, but data limitations and methodological issues remain a challenge.
One focus of research is the question whether and how internal migration affects
households at origin. This paper contributes to this strand of the literature. We investi-
gate the impact of having a new migrant on the welfare of origin households condi-
tional on their prior migration experience.
The engagement in migration of some village or community members has been
shown to significantly reduce migration costs for later migrants from that same net-
work and to improve the probability of successful job search at destination (McKenzie
and Rapoport 2007; Munshi 2003). Households themselves can gain migration experi-
ence through the engagement of their members in migration, increasing the house-
hold’s participation in future migration (Bryan et al. 2014). Therefore, the focus on new
migrants is relevant for a setting in which households have several migrant members
who move at different points in time. This is revealed by the data available in this
paper. We use primary data from a new two-wave household panel survey conducted
in Ghana in 2013 and 2015. The surveys were designed with the goal to collect as
much information as possible about migration.
The impact of migration on household welfare is often drawn from comparisons be-
tween households with and without migrants. The econometric challenge this poses is
of unobserved heterogeneity. There are unobservable factors that determine both the
fact that a household has a migrant and the outcome of interest, for example household
income. Any result from a simple comparison of households with and without migrants
would be biased. Our analysis uses a baseline of households that all have prior migra-
tion experience and data on new migrants in the intervening period in order to reduce
selection bias. We apply entropy balancing weights (Hainmueller 2012), similar to
matching methods, and exploit the panel nature of our data to overcome remaining se-
lection and omitted variable bias. The outcome variable of interest capturing household
welfare is a housing quality index constructed using multiple correspondence analysis
(MCA). We use housing quality as our measure of welfare as there is strong body of
evidence that suggests that remittances are often invested in the improvement of hous-
ing (e.g. Kagochi and Kiambigi 2012, Osili 2004, Durand et al. 1996).
Because there is little existing evidence on the consequences of idiosyncratic migra-
tion experience of households, we first describe migrants and their households in our
data to explore the dynamic patterns of migration. A comparison of the new migrants
to those migrants who left the household earlier documents that new migrants are
from a younger generation within households, such as children or grandchildren of the
head. Their migration costs are lower, possibly due to family networks and the house-
holds’ prior engagement in migration. From these observations, we derive hypotheses
for the impact assessment. Then, we estimate how the welfare of households with a
new migrant changes compared to those without, conditional on the fact that all house-
holds have previously had a migrant. We analyse whether there are heterogeneous
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effects by sex of the migrant, by reason for migration (family or work) and by destin-
ation (within or across regional borders).
We find no effect of sending a new migrant on the change in the housing quality
index of origin households compared to those households who do not engage further
in migration in the same period. This result is robust to variations in the construction
of the index, the matching method applied and community shocks. Our interpretation
is that the returns to migration might not show after the short period of our study.
Households in our sample use their savings to finance migration. They hence do not
experience a drop in their housing quality index. However, they also do not experience
an increase in their housing quality index since the new migrant left. This could be, on
the one hand, due to their use of savings to cover migration costs instead of investing
into more assets and, on the other hand, because new migrants send only rarely and
low remittances. We further suggest that due to prior engagement in migration our
sample of households does not experience an initial decline in welfare. This could be
caused by the migration costs or the loss in labour due to a member leaving (Taylor
and Lopez-Feldman, 2010). We document however that migration costs for new mi-
grants are smaller than for prior migration, which indicates that migration experience
at the household level reduces the costs of migration. In addition, prior to their move,
new migrants are either in school or doing unpaid work. It is thus less likely that their
migration implies a loss in labour income for the household.
This study builds on earlier work where we employed propensity score matching at
baseline to estimate the welfare effect of migration (Egger and Litchfield 2017). In con-
trast to the matching approach, entropy balancing weights allow us to further control
for time-varying characteristics. In addition, we previously adopted factor analysis to
construct the housing quality index, while MCA fits the data better. Extending from
that previous work, we provide a more comprehensive discussion of the sensitivity of
results and explore possible channels of the results in the data.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the literature on
impacts of migration on households left behind with respect to methodological chal-
lenges, knowledge gaps and evidence for our context. This is followed by the analytical
framework for this study in Section 3. Then, we present the data used for the analysis
(Section 4) followed by a description of the migrants, migrant households and their
prior migration experience (Section 5). In Section 6, we explain the methodology to es-
timate the impact of sending a new migrant on the welfare of origin households. In
Section 7, we provide the results and robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature review
The research interest of this paper is the short-term relationship between having a new
migrant and the welfare of origin households in rural Ghana conditional on prior mi-
gration experience. Many studies explored the more general question looking at the im-
pact of having a migrant or not on some measure of well-being of the origin
household. Antman (2012) and Mendola (2012) review this evidence. Both summarize
mixed results from the literature. The following examples illustrate the inconclusive
findings.
Empirical evidence from China by De Brauw and Giles (2012) documents an increase
in consumption growth as well as ‘increased accumulation of housing welfare and
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consumer durables’ (p.3). Quisumbing and McNiven (2010) consider the impact of mi-
gration and remittances on assets, consumption and credit constraints in the rural
Philippines. They find that a larger number of migrant children reduces the values of
non-land assets and total expenditures per adult equivalent in the origin households.
However, remittances have a positive impact on housing, consumer durables, non-land
assets and total (per adult equivalent) and educational expenditures. They find no effect
on status of credit constraint. Mendola (2008) finds an increase in investments in
agricultural production among the left behind households in Bangladesh with inter-
national migrants, but she does not find an effect of internal migration. Taylor and
López-Feldman (2010) provide evidence of a positive effect of migration to the USA on
land productivity of migrant-sending families in Mexico. They also document an in-
crease in per capita income via remittances. Damon (2010) finds only weak increases in
asset accumulation in El Salvador and no impact of migration and remittances on in-
vestments in agricultural production.
Only a few studies consider migration experience at the household level. De Brauw
and Harigaya (2007) and De Brauw (2010) provide evidence about the impact of sea-
sonal migration on household welfare or agricultural production in Vietnam. While
seasonal migration is most likely a repeated event, the authors do not specifically ac-
count for the repetition and potential learning process of the household. Bryan et al.
(2014) conduct a randomized control trial in a region in Bangladesh that is seasonally
affected by famine to understand underused seasonal migration. Their intervention was
a cash transfer to vulnerable households conditioned to finance seasonal migration of
one household member. The results show significant improvements of consumption
levels for the treated households. According to the authors’ model, migration results in
success or failure in terms of finding a job at destination and sending remittances.
Households learn from this experience, and it predicts their future engagement in mi-
gration. Further evidence for the role of migration experience within the family is pro-
vided by Giulietti et al. (2014). The authors develop a model that differentiates between
‘weak’ and ‘strong’ network ties and their role for migration decisions. Their findings
suggest that networks at community level (weak ties) and prior migration of a family
member (strong ties) act complementary, but weak ties have a higher impact on the
migration decision. No further analysis is conducted to investigate how such different
networks might influence migration and household outcomes.
In Ghana, internal migration is highly correlated with economic conditions (Castaldo et
al. 2012). Many researchers have studied the impacts of migration in Ghana with mixed
results due to the different data sources used and different methodologies applied (Ackah
and Medvedev 2010; Adams 2006; Adams et al. 2008; Adams and Cuecuecha 2013;
Litchfield and Waddington 2003; Mahé and Naudé 2016; Molini et al. 2016).
What gives rise to these mixed results? Theoretical models such as from the New
Economics of Labour Migration (NELM, Stark and Bloom 1985) cannot predict the dir-
ection of the impact of migration on origin households. The reason for this is that the
impact depends on counteracting factors. For example, De Brauw and Harigaya (2007)
model the impact of migration on consumption growth and find that the impact de-
pends on both the loss of farm production incurred by migration and the increase in
consumption due to remittance receipt as well as the costs of moving. One explanation
for mixed results therefore is that the counteracting factors of costs and rewards to
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migration materialize at different speeds (Taylor and López-Feldman 2010). The loss of
labour is felt immediately as are the costs of moving. The returns to migration in the
form of remittances contribute to higher consumption levels. They delay, however, until
the migrant has arrived at the destination, found a job and earned enough income to
send some of it back home. It might take even longer for remittances to accumulate
enough to invest in assets. Other aspects that contribute to the mixed results are the
different data, definitions for migration and methodologies used. Migrants, or migrant
households, are not a random sample of the population, but observable and unobserv-
able factors determine their participation in migration. These factors can affect the out-
comes of interest at the same time. In addition, the outcome itself can affect the
migration decision. This is especially an issue in cross-sectional data.
This study contributes to the understanding of internal migration in Ghana and its
consequences for origin households by using novel data. We exploit the panel nature of
the data and apply a new method from the evaluation literature to reduce concerns of
bias. We condition the analysis on prior migration experience. Thus, we contribute to
the literature aiming to understand whether households learn from migration and what
the implications are for future migration at household level and consequent welfare im-
pacts, specifically for investments in housing quality.
3 Analytical framework
This paper investigates whether having a new migrant is related to a change in the wel-
fare of the migrant’s household at origin conditional on migration experience. The ana-
lysis is set in two periods, baseline and follow-up. All households have at least one
member who is a migrant in the baseline period. Thus, they have previously engaged in
migration, which we define as ‘migration experience’. A migrant is defined in the sur-
veys as a member of the household who is currently absent, left at least 3 months ago,
but not more than 5 years.
A new migrant is defined as a household member who is present in the household in
the baseline period and who then moves at least to another community and is still away
in the follow-up period.1 We look at new migrants, because it appears to be common
for households to have more than one migrant and to see them move at different times.
Thus, we are not interested in just the number of migrants, but in the dynamic aspect
of another member migrating. Furthermore, it removes some of the selection bias of
households into migration. To give an example, imagine a household as depicted in the
following table (Table 1).
Table 1 Example household with baseline and new migrant
Household member Migrant in baseline Migrant in follow-up
A 1 1
B 0 0
C 0 0
D 1 0
E 0 1
Total 2 2
Source: Authors’ compilation
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This household has five members. At baseline, member A and member D are away as
migrants. In the follow-up period, member A is still away as a migrant, while member
D has returned to the household. Now, member E is away as a migrant. If we were to
compare only the total number of migrants away, we would see no difference between
these two periods for this household. However, member D might have returned with
money for the household and will now contribute again to the household production
(farm or business), and he or she potentially returned with new skills that could im-
prove the returns to her or his labour. At the same time, for member E to migrate, the
household had to incur some costs, maybe by selling assets or using savings. These fac-
tors have different impacts on the household welfare, so we focus on new migrants in-
stead of the total number of migrants. Thus, this example household would be defined
as a household with migration experience and a new migrant. Member E would be this
new migrant.
Different aspects determine the impact of having a new migrant. Firstly, migra-
tion is costly and can initially lead to a decline in welfare due to the costs incurred
as well as the loss in labour. Secondly, migration is beneficial when migrants send
money back to their origin household and thus create another source of income.
Thirdly, migration can be beneficial for the migrant him or herself directly. There
might be more and better opportunities to earn an income or pursue further edu-
cation at destination than at origin. Moreover, the household has one member less
to care for and it might derive utility from the fact that the migrant can find a
better livelihood somewhere else.
However, it is not clear in which direction the effect should work and which fac-
tor dominates. The aforementioned factors work in different directions. Addition-
ally, in our specific case, households have migration experience at baseline before
they have a new migrant, which can influence the effect. While sending a new mi-
grant can incur costs, these might be lower conditional on prior migration experi-
ence of the household.
Following this discussion, we look at the impact of sending a new migrant condi-
tional on migration experience. The sample is therefore first restricted only to
households with migration experience at baseline. Then, households are assigned to
a group called ‘treated’ and another one named ‘control’. Households are in the
treated group if they have at least one new migrant between the two periods. The
remaining households without a new migrant between the two periods are in the
control group.2 This definition implies that households can have more than one
new migrant and they can have several baseline migrants. Our sample is restricted
to those households whose new migrants were present members of the household
in the baseline period.
4 Data
The data used for this analysis is a household survey collected in April/May 2013 and
again of the same households in April/May 2015.3 In this way, the households are inter-
viewed during the same season to avoid issues of seasonality between survey waves. We
call this data set MooP Ghana panel study from here on.
In the first wave, around 1400 households were surveyed, and in the second wave,
the team was able to follow up with around 1100 of them.4 Based on the 2010 Ghana
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Population and Housing Census (Ghana Statistical Service 2013), five major source re-
gions of migration were identified as survey regions, the Northern region, the Upper
East, Upper West, Brong Ahafo and Volta region. Consequently, the household sample
is not nationally representative. In a two-stage stratified sampling design, enumeration
areas (EA) were randomly selected to be proportional to the number of migrants from
each region. Within each EA, households were then randomly selected from a list cate-
gorized by migrant and non-migrant households, oversampling households with mi-
grants. With this approach, we achieved a feasible sample of migrants, which in most
nationally representative surveys remains difficult.
The questionnaire was directed at the household head and asked about the demo-
graphics of each household member, their education and employment status, as well as
their migration history. Migrants are members who are currently not living in the
household and who have been away for at least 3 months, but less than 10 (in 2013) or
5 years (in 2015). Sixty percent of households in the treatment group for this analysis
have only one new migrant, 25% have two and the remaining 15% have three or more
new migrants in the study period.
After cleaning the data and making sure that the main variables of interest are avail-
able for all households in both survey waves, we are left with a balanced panel of 960
household-year observations. One hundred thirty-one migrant households are in the
treated group, and 349 in the control group.
5 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides an overview of the basic demographic characteristics of the migrants
by migrant status (baseline or new migrant) and sex. Of the 2013 migrants, 38% are fe-
male, and in 2015, we observe an increase in the share of migrants who are women.
New migrants are on average younger, and relatively more of them are single. They
are from a younger generation within the household, often sons or daughters of the
household head or even from the third generation. Relatively more of the new migrants
have no or only primary education compared to baseline migrants.
Figure 1 presents the modes of financing migration. The most common way to fi-
nance migration in 2013 was savings, indicating that migration is an investment under
credit constraints. Savings are also the most common source of financing migration for
new migrants in 2015. The category ‘Others’ is in most cases money from a parent and
in some cases from the migrant her or himself. Other modes of financing appear less
important.
In terms of costs of migration, new migrants pay on average less than baseline mi-
grants do as presented in Table 3. Using the information on previous migration, we find
that migrants who move the first time—independent of whether they are new or base-
line migrants—pay on average two times more than those who moved the second time
or more often.
These observations suggest that costs can be reduced through migration experience
within the household. This is not owed to a general decline in migration costs. Looking
only at migrants who moved in 2015 from a household without any migrants in 2013,
we find that they pay around 203 Ghanaian Cedi, similar to the average moving costs
of baseline migrants. Despite lower costs of migration, the new migrants moved
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relatively more often to another region in Ghana than remaining in their own district
or region which normally is associated with higher moving costs.
Remittance sending behaviour in the 12 months preceding the survey is different be-
tween baseline and new migrants (see Table 4). Among new migrants, fewer remit and
they remit lower amounts and less frequently compared to baseline migrants.
Fig. 1 Financing modes of migration, by type and sex of migrant
Table 2 Demographic information of migrants, by year and sex
Baseline (2013) New (2015)
Male Female Male Female
Observations (N) 592 359 107 108
Age (in years) 32.4 30.7 25.6 26.8
Marital status
Single 44.6 42.7 68.4 47.8
Married/living with partner 54 50.6 30.5 48.9
Separated/divorced/widowed 1.5 6.7 1.1 3.3
Relation to head
Head 8.3 1.9 3.7 1.9
Spouse/partner 3.4 11.4 2.8 3.7
Child/adopted child 52.4 49 49.5 51.9
Grandchild/niece/nephew 10.3 13.7 27.1 25.9
Other relatives 25.4 23.9 15.9 15
Not related 0.3 0 0.9 1.9
Education
None 14 18.6 23.7 31.5
Primary 16.7 18.6 22.7 15.7
Middle/junior 31 30.4 27.8 22.5
High/senior 21.5 19.3 15.5 16.9
College/technical 16.7 13.2 10.3 13.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MooP Ghana panel study
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6 Methodology
6.1 Empirical strategy
We estimate the impact of having a new migrant on household welfare in the following
specification:
yit ¼ β12015t þ β2NewMig2015it þ β3Xit þ β4LMct þ Hi þ εit ð1Þ
Our interest is to see how the welfare of households changes when they have a new
migrant. With two time periods, we regress the outcome variable yit for household i on
the treatment status of a household, NewMigi, interacted with a dummy indicating the
second survey year, 2015t. NewMigi is a dummy indicating whether the household has
a new migrant or not. We also control for the general change of welfare over time by
including the dummy for the second survey year separately. We include household
fixed effects, γi, that automatically discard any unobservable characteristics of the
households that do not vary between the survey waves.
The parameter of interest is β2, the coefficient of the interaction. It measures the ef-
fect of having a new migrant between the two survey waves on the welfare of the origin
household compared to those households that did not see another member migrate.
The time-varying household characteristics, Xit, are the dependency ratio, whether
the household has a returned migrant and the employment status of the household
head (unemployed/unpaid work, self-employed, employed or inactive). These can all
affect household welfare, and they can change within the period under investigation. If
a household has another child or if one of the older members becomes too old to work,
then welfare might decline, as per capita income declines. Similarly, if a household head
Table 3 Migration costs
Baseline (2013) New (2015)
In GHS of 2015 N In GHS of 2015 N
All migrants 209 331 128 123
First-time movers 331 137 160 74
Moved at least once before 142 132 78 41
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MooP Ghana panel study
Table 4 Remittances
Baseline (2013) New (2015)
Male Female Male Female
Percentage remitting cash 63.8 53.7 40.5 38.6
Amount in GHS of 2015 (US$) 788.7 655.1 607.9 515.2
Frequency of remitting (%)
Weekly/fortnightly 2.2 1.7 0 7.4
Monthly 24.3 19.2 17.2 11.5
Every couple of months 43.1 40.8 13.8 15.4
Every 6 months or more 11.6 15.9 17.2 15.3
Only on special occasions or emergencies 18.7 22.5 51.7 50
Percentage remitting goods 44 49.6 28.4 26.8
Observations 592 359 107 108
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MooP Ghana panel study
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becomes unemployed, this affects household welfare negatively. Finally, a migrant who
returns to the origin household can, on the one hand, bring home money and invest it
in assets to increase welfare or, on the other hand, the returnee might have failed at
destination and now presents an additional burden to the household.
The local labour market variable, LMct, is the employment rate in a community c. It
is measured as the share of individuals who work as wage employees relative to the
local labour force. This is included because a household seeking to diversify its income
sources will consider local opportunities, where household members could earn a
wage.5
We estimate the fixed effects model in a weighted least squares regression applying
entropy balancing weights. These weights are used to make the control group look
comparable to the treated households in terms of household characteristics at baseline,
in 2013. This reduces the selection bias that can challenge the analysis of migration
impacts.
6.2 Dependent variable: housing quality index
The outcome variable is an index of housing quality constructed using multiple corres-
pondence analysis (MCA) and includes the number of rooms, dwelling ownership, the
presence of a bathroom and a toilet, main source of drinking water and the floor and
wall material. Additional file 1: Table S1 provides a detailed overview of asset owner-
ship in the sample.
The empirical literature suggests that households with migrants often use remittances
to improve their housing (Kagochi and Kiambigi 2012, Osili 2004, Durand et al. 1996).
However, these studies do not differentiate between first and successive migrants. It is
possible that households who already have migrant members might have already used
their remittances to improve their housing and consequently do not require more in-
vestments. This is unlikely to be the case in rural Ghana: comparing households in our
sample at baseline, households which have already received remittance from first mi-
grants, we see that they still have low levels of basic amenities, e.g. toilets or potable
water. These levels are comparable to those seen among rural households in the lower
consumption quintiles according the 2013 Ghana Living Standards Survey (see Add-
itional file 1: Table S1. Hence, the data suggest that our household sample could sub-
stantially improve their housing through investment financed through remittances.
Figure 2 presents the housing quality index in 2013 of households with a new mi-
grant and of those without, and Fig. 3 depicts the same for 2015.
These figures illustrate that the distributions of the housing quality index overlap in
2013, but they shift apart in 2015. It seems that households without a new migrant have
a higher distribution of the index.
6.3 Identification strategy
Several issues challenge the empirical identification of the impact of migration on
households left behind.
Firstly, we can think of factors that simultaneously affect both the migration decision
and the outcome. For example, risk aversion of a household might prevent it from en-
gaging in migration or in more profitable but riskier technologies in their farm or
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Fig. 2 Housing quality index of treated and control households in 2013
Fig. 3 Housing quality index of treated and control households in 2015
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business. Hence, such households would be less likely to have a new migrant and would
remain at a lower welfare level. Such omitted variables would bias the coefficient of
interest. In the given example, we would overestimate a negative effect of having a new
migrant. We cannot foresee the direction of the effect, but it would be biased upwards.
By modelling a fixed effect model, we capture any unobservable time-invariant factors
at the household level.
Secondly, the migration decision could be influenced by the outcome variable. This is
especially a problem with cross-sectional data (Antman 2012). The change in asset
ownership in the period preceding our baseline could affect the treatment status of
households. We cannot exploit previous data to control for this, but by balancing
households on baseline characteristics, we only compare those that look similar and
thus capture any effect the prior welfare change had on households.
We apply a weighting method that makes the comparison group look like the treated
group in terms of observable characteristics at baseline. This approach assumes selec-
tion on observables. It means that conditional on observable characteristics, having a
new migrant is as good as random (Wooldridge 2010). This balance is achieved for ob-
servable characteristics that are expected to influence the likelihood to be a treated
household and the outcome variable (Imbens 2015). Once these observables are bal-
anced, the selection bias is reduced (Heckman et al. 1998).
6.3.1 Entropy balancing weights
The weighting method applied is called entropy balancing developed by Hainmueller
(2012). This approach defines weights for each observation that ensure a predefined
balance of covariates. The balance can be defined in terms of the first, second and even
higher order moments of observables. The main advantages of this method are that bal-
ance checks become redundant, the majority of observations are retained, the computa-
tion of the weights is fast and the method can be combined with many other matching
and regression methods, similarly to inverse probability weighting methods and regres-
sion adjustment procedures (Imbens 2015).
Entropy weights, w, minimize the entropy distance metric, which is defined as:
min
wi
H wð Þ ¼
X
ijD¼0wi log
wi
qi
 
ð3Þ
and which is subject to balance (Eq. 4) and normalizing constraints (Eqs. 5 and 6
respectively):
X
ijD¼0wicri Xið Þ ¼ mr with r∈1;…;R and ð4Þ
X
ijD¼0wi ¼ 1 and ð5Þ
wi≥0 for all i such that D ¼ 0 ð6Þ
qi is a base weight defined as 1 over the number of control units. cri(Xi) are ‘a set of R
balance constraints [that are] imposed on the covariate moments of the reweighted
control group’ (Hainmueller and Xu 2013, p. 4). Finally, it computes a set of weights
that minimize the first Eq. (3) subject to the balance constraint, the normalization con-
straint and the non-negativity constraint. Once the weights have been computed, they
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are applied to estimate Eq. 1 with weighted least squares (WLS). This approach works
like any regression adjustment method (Wooldridge 2010).
6.3.2 Variables to balance
We include all variables that we consider substantive for having a new migrant or for
the outcome. We also include squared terms of continuous variables (Imbens and
Rubin 2015; Smith and Todd 2005). Region dummies should capture any such factors
that relate to migrant networks, regional development and economic opportunities.
Most importantly, we control for the household size and dependency ratio of elderly
and children to adult members to capture the household structure. These variables are
important for the household decision about migration as well as the household’s wel-
fare. Another important characteristic is the main household income source, that is,
whether the household earns its living from agriculture, wage employment, its own
business and public or private transfers. We also control for the employment status of
the household head (employed, self-employed, unemployed or inactive) to capture
economic activity. As a measure for human capital in the household, we include
the highest level of education of adult members in the household. Many studies
show that education is an important predictor for households’ welfare. It is also re-
lated to migration decisions as higher educated people have higher expected in-
comes at home as well as at possible destinations (Sjaastad 1962). We include a
dummy for female household heads, shown to be a strong predictor for household
welfare in the rural context as well as reflecting households’ options for migration
decisions (Adams and Cuecuecha 2013). In addition, age and marital status of the
household head are added to control for the life cycle of a household (Lipton
1980). Ethnicity was found to be an important factor in creating and maintaining
migrant networks in Ghana (Awumbila et al. 2016). Such networks are important
determinants for migration decisions as they reduce the risk and costs associated
with migration (Carrington et al. 1996), which is why we include the ethnicity of
the household head. We also include our measure of community employment rate.
We choose this measure, because if a household seeks to diversify its income
sources, it will also consider other opportunities in the community where house-
hold members could earn a wage (Bazzi 2017).
In a credit constraint context, only households at a certain level of wealth are able to
afford migration (McKenzie and Rapoport 2007). Thus, only households with a similar
level and distribution of welfare should be compared. While we do not have informa-
tion on economic welfare pre-dating our baseline as suggested by Smith and Todd
(2005), we include a rich set of asset indicators and information on asset purchases in
the computation of balancing weights. These are the components used to construct the
housing quality index and dummies that are equal to 1 if a household has purchased a
specific asset within the past 5 years before the baseline survey, 0 otherwise.6 In this
way, we can capture a certain level of wealth and investment behaviour of the house-
hold that pre-dates the baseline.
In Additional file 1: Table S2, we show the mean and variance of the variables that
were included in the construction of the entropy balancing weights with the weights
applied to the control group. Using the weights leads to identical means and variances
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of all variables. The entropy balancing weights construct a comparable sample of
households to reduce the selection bias.
7 Results
7.1 Main results
Table 5 presents the results. The coefficient of interest is the dummy variable of having
a new migrant interacted with the second survey wave indicator, 2015. This estimates
the average effect on the change in the housing quality index for households with a
new migrant between the baseline and the follow-up survey compared to households
without a new migrant.
In column 1, we show results without applying entropy balancing weights, suggesting
that they might be biased due to selection. The effect of migration on household wel-
fare could be driven by the fact that only households who are less likely to improve
their welfare due to household characteristics sent a new migrant because of these
same characteristics. We then apply balancing weights to the regression in column 2.
The coefficient becomes larger but remains insignificant. In column 3, time-varying
household and local labour market characteristics are included that we consider
Table 5 Effect of having a new migrant on housing quality index, weighted least squares
Wealth index
(1) (2) (3)
New migrant * 2015 − 0.011 − 0.017 − 0.016
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
2015 (= 1) 0.001 0.007 0.012
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Household has return migrant (= 1) − 0.015*
(0.008)
Dependency ratio 0.002
(0.004)
Occupation of household head (base = inactive/others)
Employee 0.014
(0.015)
Self-employed − 0.001
(0.016)
Unpaid work/unemployed − 0.003
(0.018)
Local employment rate 0.138
(0.104)
Entropy balancing weights No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 960 960 960
Adjusted R2 0.584 0.522 0.528
Number of clusters 93 93 93
Notes: Significance levels *10%, **5%, and ***1%. Fixed effects estimator. S.E. clustered at community level. Column 1
runs model 1 without further control variables and without applying entropy balancing weights. In column 2, these
weights are applied. In column 3, time-varying control variables are added to the model. Source: Authors’ calculations
based on MooP Ghana panel study
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relevant for the welfare of households. Of all control variables, only that indicating
whether a household had a return migrant or not is significant.7 Households are on
average slightly worse off if they had a migrant return to their home. The majority of
these return migrants states to have returned due to reasons such as homesickness, ill-
ness, family issues or unsuccessful job search which could explain the negative welfare
effect of returnees.
The inclusion of time-varying covariates improves the precision of the estimates min-
imally, as indicated by a higher adjusted R-squared statistic. The coefficient of interest
becomes minimally smaller. On average and everything else constant, sending a new
migrant does not change the housing quality index of households significantly com-
pared to those who do not send another migrant.
We now look further into the role of migrant characteristics. Table 6 lists the coeffi-
cients of the main estimation, each time interacting the treatment dummy with a mi-
grant feature. These characteristics are whether the new migrant is female, a seasonal
migrant or whether they moved within the same region compared to another region.
None of these interactions shows a significant effect on the housing quality index.8
There are three possible explanations for the fact that we do not find an impact of
having a new migrant on households’ housing quality index. One refers to the outcome
variable used, one to the role of migration experience and the third one to the sample
investigated.
First, considering that asset indices are less volatile than for example consumption
measures, it might be due to their stable nature that we do not find a significant effect
in the short period of 2 years. We emphasize that the estimated effect is that of house-
holds sending a new migrant compared to those who do not. Hence, even a zero effect
does not imply that there was no change in the housing quality index, but it means that
the index of treated households changed in the same direction and magnitude as that
of the control group. The distributional graphs of the welfare index (Figs. 2 and 3 in
Section 6.2) indicated some changes in the welfare of households. It appears, however,
not to be significantly different between the groups once we control for observable and
unobservable household characteristics. Booysen et al. (2008) also point out that
Table 6 Interaction of treatment with the characteristics of new migrants
Dependent variable: wealth index
Migrant characteristics Female migrant Seasonal migrant Moved within region
New migrant *X* 2015 − 0.009 0.010 − 0.013
(0.011) (0.014) (0.021)
New migrant * 2015 − 0.010 − 0.017 − 0.005
(0.014) (0.012) (0.022)
Entropy balancing weights Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 960 960 960
Adjusted R2 0.528 0.528 0.528
Number of clusters 93 93 93
Notes: Significance levels *10%, **5%, and ***1%. Fixed effects estimator. S.E. clustered at community level; other controls
include whether the household has a returned migrant, occupation of the household head, dependency ratio and
community employment rate. Source: Authors’ calculations based on MooP Ghana panel study
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because assets are more durable than other consumption goods, they tend to show an
increase in asset wealth more than a reduction of the same. As our coefficients are
negative, it is possible that we cannot find a significant effect due to this issue.
Owing to the constriction of our housing quality index, the only possibility for house-
holds to increase their housing quality index would have been through investments in
their housing. Using responses to questions on past improvements to housing, we re-
gress the likelihood to invest in better housing on the indicator for having a new mi-
grant (Table 7).
The results confirm that households with a new migrant are significantly less likely to
have invested in the refurbishment of their house between survey waves. In contrast,
there is no significant impact on investments in land or other assets, although this
could be due to the very low number of observations. Furthermore, successive migra-
tion is financed mostly through savings so they cannot be used for housing invest-
ments. This stands in contrast to previous findings of remittances being used for
housing improvements (Kagochi and Kiambigi 2012, Osili 2004). Our results suggest
that remittance behaviour by successive migrants and the usage of their remittances ap-
pear to differ for first and successive migrants.
Secondly, we suggest that migration of a new migrant might be less costly than
first-time migration. If we consider migration as an investment, then we would expect
an initial decline in welfare and in the longer run an increase as suggested by Taylor
and Lopez-Feldman (2010). We do not observe that households with a new migrant ex-
perience a decline in welfare that could have been caused by the cost of migration and
the loss of a working household member. In the descriptive statistics, we saw that costs
for new migrants are relatively lower than for previous migrants. Similar to the reduc-
tion of migration costs with the growth of social migrant networks, the migration ex-
perience at the household level itself can reduce costs of migration (Bryan et al. 2014).
This could be happening through similar channels, such as information transfer and
family connections at the destination to find a job.
Another reason for not finding an effect might be that we are looking at the wrong
sample. Some of the new migrants move for family reasons, such as marriage or joining
other family members, or for education, while the majority moves for work. These
Table 7 Effect of having a new migrant on likelihood to invest in different activities
Refurbishment
of house
Improvement to
agricultural land
Development of
non-agricultural land
Others
New migrant * 2015 − 0.2972** 0.1310 0.3897 0.1298
(0.153) (0.118) (6.386) (0.260)
2015 (=1) 0.1685* − 0.1174 − 0.3635 0.0274
(0.101) (0.102) (5.957) (0.051)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 158 108 54 60
Pseudo R2 0.186 0.373 0.548 0.519
Log likelihood − 26.4 − 13.7 − 2.33 − 4.86
Notes: Significance levels *10%, **5%, and ***1%. Fixed effects estimator. S.E. clustered at community level. Other
controls include whether the household has a returned migrant, employment status of the household head, dependency
ratio and community employment rate. Source: Authors’ calculations based on MooP Ghana panel study
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reasons can have quite different implications for remittance behaviour as well as
household welfare. We therefore estimate the effect of a new migrant including the
interaction of the treatment with an indicator for migration motive. Table 8 shows
the results. They do not change either for the main estimate nor for the inter-
action with the migration motive. All we observe is that the coefficient of the
interaction that indicates households with a new migrant moving for family reasons
is positive, while the overall treatment effect is negative. All are however always
statistically insignificant.
7.2 Sensitivity analysis
One concern is measurement error in the housing quality index owing to its construc-
tion from individual factor variables. In consequence, the estimates are still unbiased
and consistent, but less precise which could explain the insignificant results (Wool-
dridge 2010). We would be concerned if there was a reason to think that measurement
error in the index was systematically related to the independent variables in our model.
We therefore estimate the main regression and exclude each time one component of
the index to see how sensitive the results are to this. We find stable results across index
compositions presented in Table 9.
We also check whether the results are sensitive to whether we use the pooled or only
the baseline sample to construct the index. The results do not change (presented in
Additional file 1: Table S4). Another issue might be that prices for assets change over
time and in response to this the demand for assets and the distribution of assets across
households might change. There is, though, no reason to think that households with a
new migrant would react differently than control households to price changes in their
asset purchase behaviour.
Finally, we run a difference-in-difference model on households matched at base-
line applying propensity score matching (PSM) instead of entropy balancing
weights similar to the analysis in Egger and Litchfield (2017). Results remain the
same (see Additional file 1: Table S5).
Table 8 Testing for heterogeneity by migration motives
Dependent variable: housing quality index
Reason for migration Family Work Education
New migrant * 2015 − 0.019 − 0.011 − 0.014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
New migrant moves for X reason * 2015 0.016 − 0.009 − 0.010
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013)
Entropy balancing weights Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 960 960 960
Adjusted R2 0.529 0.528 0.528
Notes: Significance levels *10%, **5%, and ***1%. Fixed effects estimator. S.E. clustered at community level; other
controls include whether the household has a returned migrant, occupation of the household head, dependency ratio
and community employment rate. Source: Authors’ calculations based on MooP Ghana panel study
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7.3 Community shocks
One major concern challenging our identification strategy is that of unobserved shocks
experienced by the households between the two survey waves. A shock could reduce
household welfare and at the same time motivate people to leave their home or deter
migration, as savings would be used to cover the damages of the shock instead of finan-
cing migration. This could affect whether we observe an impact of having a new mi-
grant on welfare of households left behind.
In 2015, the enumerators interviewed village elders to collect information about the
communities. These surveys included questions about shocks experienced by the village
and how many people were affected by it. The questions were asked open ended, so that
the respondent could name any type of shock that s/he considered relevant. The most
commonly named shocks are droughts, flooding or crop infestation by insects. We identi-
fied the communities where at least 50% of inhabitants were affected by such a shock.
In Table 10, we present the results of the main specification, only that we include a
dummy variable indicating a major shock at the community level and interact this with
the treatment indicator. This interaction captures the impact of households that experi-
enced a shock and have a new migrant in 2015. The impact of having a new migrant
on the housing quality index remains insignificant. Neither the coefficient of the shock
variable nor its interaction with the treatment is significant.
After this test, one could still argue that an unobserved idiosyncratic shock at the
household level interferes with our results. For example, a household would normally
have experienced an increase in its housing quality index, but a negative shock inter-
fered with this trajectory, for example, a household member falling sick and not being
able to earn income. Instead of investing in better walls or expanding the rooms of the
house, the money is used to send another member as a new migrant to find an income
somewhere else or to pay for the medical bills. Only in very few cases (3%) had a new
migrant moved due to negative events, such as declining yields in agriculture, a family
dispute, a flood or for medical treatment. Aside from lack of evidence that the reason
of migration is an idiosyncratic shock, new migrants barely send remittances. If they
Table 9 Sensitivity of results of impact of having a new migrant on housing quality index using
different specifications to construct index, weighted least squares
Dependent variable: housing quality index
Exclude specific item from housing quality index construction:
Number of
rooms
Dwelling
ownership
Bathroom Toilet Drinking
water
Floor
material
Wall
material
New migrant * 2015 0.019 − 0.017 − 0.017 − 0.015 − 0.020 − 0.013 − 0.009
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008)
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Entropy balancing weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 960 960 960 960 960 960 960
Adjusted R2 0.515 0.473 0.524 0.47 0.462 0.544 0.485
Number of clusters 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
Notes: Significance levels *10%, **5%, and ***1%. Fixed effects estimator. S.E. clustered at community level; each column
presents the result of estimating the main model with the outcome variable being the housing quality index excluding
one item respectively. Other controls include whether the household has a returned migrant, occupation of the
household head, dependency ratio and community employment rate. Source: Authors’ calculations based on MooP
Ghana panel study
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had been sent to support the household through a crisis, one would expect regular re-
mittances and higher amounts.
8 Conclusion
This paper documents the dynamic nature within households of internal migration in
rural Ghana. Using a new panel dataset from 2013 and 2015, we show that many house-
holds with migrants at the baseline sent a new migrant by 2015. Looking more closely at
these migrants and their households, we provide an insight into the nature of such succes-
sive migration. Within the same household, migrants move for different reasons and at
different times and their connection with the origin household differs as well.
This motivates the question of how households with prior migration experience are
affected if they have a new migrant. There are hypotheses for positive, negative or no
effect due to the variety of factors involved and their counteracting impacts.
We find that having a new migrant does not have an impact on the housing quality
index of origin households compared to those without a new migrant. We suggest that
this is partially due to the stable nature of such an index over the short period of our
analysis. In order to identify an impact, the households in our sample would have
needed to invest in their housing to different extent between treated and control group.
However, their investment priorities might lie somewhere else, for example, in their
farm or business. Previous studies have found that remittances are invested in better
housing whereas we do not find this for successive migrants, suggesting that behaviour
differs. One insight from the literature is that older migrants are more likely to send re-
mittances home to be used for housing improvements (Osili 2004) and that this may
be in anticipation of a return home. Our sample of first migrants are older at the time
of survey than successive migrants, so our results may further reflect different inten-
tions surrounding return.
Another insight we gain is that new migrants pay relatively less for their migration
than baseline migrants. This indicates that migration becomes cheaper with the
Table 10 Effect of new migrant on household welfare controlling for major shocks in community
Wealth index
New migrant*2015 − 0.021
(0.018)
New migrant *shock* 2015 0.015
(0.023)
Shock − 0.018
(0.017)
Entropy balancing weights Yes
Other controls Yes
Household fixed effects Yes
Observations 902
Adjusted R2 0.521
Number of clusters 87
Notes: Significance levels *10%, **5%, and ***1%. Fixed effects estimator. S.E. clustered at community level; other
controls include whether the household has a returned migrant, occupation of the household head, dependency ratio
and community employment rate. Source: Authors’ calculations based on MooP Ghana panel study
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migration experience of the household so that a negative effect of migration incurred
by moving costs might not materialize in this case. Furthermore, we observed that new
migrants are in many aspects different from baseline migrants. Among the differences
are for example the fact that new migrants are from a younger generation, coming
straight from school and often not sending any remittances or only for special occa-
sions. This also supports the zero effect we find for the housing quality index. House-
holds with prior migration experience might not send a new migrant in expectation of
future remittances and income diversification. Instead, the new migrants might move
primarily to improve their own situation.
These unanswered hypotheses point at the limitations of this study. The effect we es-
timate is that of only 2 years or less since a new migrant left the household. The com-
parison of studies using longitudinal data from longer periods with those of short
periods indicates that the positive returns to migration might only present itself after a
certain period (Davis et al. 2010; Taylor and Lopez-Feldman, 2010). More data collec-
tion is required to confirm our results over the longer run.
Endnotes
1It is possible that the new migrant had migrated in the past. In such a case, not only
the household as a whole would have migration experience but also the individual mi-
grant. The response rate to the question asking how many times a migrant moved be-
fore is unfortunately very low so we cannot control for this in the analysis.
2We could include households that had a return migrant at baseline, but no current
migrant. They also have migration experience. However, there are no such households
in our data.
3The data was collected by the Migrating out of Poverty (MooP) Research Program
Consortium in collaboration with the Centre of Migration Studies, University of Ghana.
4Between the two waves of the survey, we lose 167 households which had a migrant
at baseline. Modelling of the attrition suggests that the attrited households are more
similar to our control group, that is, they would have been less likely to have new mi-
grants. However, without knowing what their housing quality trajectory would have
been had they stayed in the sample, we cannot speculate about any potential bias this
may have introduced. See Egger (2018) for details.
5This measure is obtained using all individuals in our data in each community. Based
on their main activity, we define those who are employed and we sum all who are ei-
ther employed, unemployed, doing unpaid work or self-employed. This captures how
common paid employment is in a community and thus reflects the local opportunities
for wage work outside the family farm or business.
6These assets are electric household goods, white household goods, livestock, gener-
ator, car, computer, electronic appliances, other investments, agricultural land, agricul-
tural machinery, non-agricultural land and new house.
7There might arise the concern that the measure of local employment is not well de-
fined. When we drop this variable from the estimation, results remain unchanged (see
Additional file 1: Table S3).
8In Egger (2018), we used the number of new migrants as a measure of intensity of
treatment, rather than a dummy variable, but there was no change in the results.
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Additional file
Additional file 1: Table S1. Asset ownership by group and year. Table S2. First and second moments of covariates
after applying entropy balancing weights, by group in 2013. Table S3. Effect of having a new migrant on asset index
excluding local employment rate, weighted least squares. Table S4. Effect of having a new migrant on asset index
using pooled data to construct index, weighted least squares. Table S5. Effect of new migrant on household welfare
applying propensity score matching at baseline. (DOCX 30 kb)
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